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Abstract
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of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at sdavies@worldbank.org.  .  
Romania faces an acute population crisis with an aging 
workforce and an increased number of emigrants particu-
larly from the young, highly educated/skilled population. 
This paper uses a new cross-sectional data set of Romanian 
emigrants to find which factors are related to plans to return 
home permanently. The analysis pays particular attention 
to differences in expected earnings and skills and training 
acquired as a migrant. The study finds that higher expected 
earnings in Romania and investment in Romanian firms are 
positively correlated with plans to return migrate. Policies 
that boost productivity and therefore wages as well as policies 
that improve the business climate could therefore encourage 
Romanian migrants to return to Romania, moderating the 
negative consequences of the declining and aging population, 
and increasing the skill stock of the Romanian labor force.
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 I Introduction 
The question of economic migration within the European Union continues to generate much 
debate within and outside academia.  This debate is not helped by inaccurate information on the 
number of economic migrants, asylum seekers, and illegal migrants from outside the EU 
(Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008) as well as confusion as to who is a migrant and who is not 
(e.g., foreign born or foreign citizen).  Because of these problems, international agencies tend to 
use estimates when discussing migration flows between countries and regions. Although the 
accuracy of the number of migrant workers is sometimes questionable, there is a well-established 
literature on what causes people to migrate within or between countries,3 including wage 
differentials, risk preferences, job prospects, migrant networks and objectives of migrants.  A 
well-established literature has emerged as to the costs and benefits of migration in relation to the 
host country.4   
A large body of work has also emerged analyzing whether migration is bad for the country of 
origin (e.g., brain-drain of the highly educated) or whether previously unrecognized feedback 
effects benefit the country (brain-gain5).  Another strand of the migration discussion focuses on 
whether migrants are permanent or temporary, with the latter leading to theoretical and empirical 
work on the causes of return migration.   
This paper focuses on the planned migration return of current Romanian emigrants and what 
correlates with this plan to return.  This is a relevant question given the Romanian population is 
estimated to have fallen from 21.8 million to 19 million between 2002 and 2011 (Figure 1).  
Outward migration was responsible for over half of this decline. Restrictions on Romanians’ 
right to work in most European Union (EU) countries did not prevent an increase in the stock 
of Romanian migrants abroad, from 1.3 million in 2000 to 2.8 million in 2010 (World Bank 
migration tables), or from 4.8 to 14.3 percent of the resident population in Romania (Figure 2).  
Migration may have acted as an important ‘safety valve’ in the functioning of labor markets in 
Romania during the 2000s.  Many of those who would otherwise have registered as unemployed 
chose to leave Romania instead. On average, during the 2000s, 15.4 percent of migrants were 
unemployed when they left Romania compared with a national average unemployment rate of 
3 Seminal work stems from Hicks (1932) who argued wage differences between countries was the main motivator 
for migrating, while Sjaastad (1962) and Becker (1964) argued that human capital theory triggered migration.  There 
are several excellent reviews of migration theory including Greenwood (1997), Borjas (1999), Chiswick (1999), Bauer 
and Zimmermann (1999) and Massey et al, (1993). 
4 For a review of the theoretical and empirical evidence see Dustmann and Glitz (2005). 
5 See Elmenstein and Stark (1998), Beine et al (2001, 2008), Stark (2003), Schiff (2005) who argue that greater 
returns to human capital abroad encourages greater migration but also greater accumulation of human capital in the 
home country improving the average productivity/quality of the domestic labour force. 
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6.9 percent (Figure 3). While unemployment in other Eastern European countries fluctuated as 
expected with the economic boom of the 2000s and the downturn since 2008, in Romania 
unemployment responded comparatively little to the prevailing economic conditions. This was 
particularly beneficial during the crisis. When unemployment increased sharply in other 
countries, the response by many Romanians was to migrate, with a strong moderating effect on 
the unemployment rate (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 1 Estimated Romanian Population 
 
Sources: Eurostat; INSEE; Authors’ estimations 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Estimated Romanian Migrants 
 
Source: World Bank Migration Tables 
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Figure 3. Comparative Annual Average Unemployment Rate       
 
 
Figure 4. National and Migrant Unemployment Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is also evidence that a brain drain effect has occurred with earlier migrants being less 
skilled than later migrants.  Figure 5 illustrates the increasing proportion of migrants with tertiary 
education compared to the general population.  The human capital stock has been falling and 
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are finding it hard to recruit appropriate skilled employees. Even after the negative impacts of 
the financial crisis, the 2013 Enterprise Survey found that over a third of firms found lack of 
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graduate studies abroad planned to do so. If migrants – particularly the well-educated – fail to 
return, then this brain-drain may have serious consequences for future Romanian growth and 
development.  
 
Figure 5  Percentage of Migrants and Population with High-School and Tertiary 
Education  
 
Sources: Eurostat; IASCI; Soros Foundation; Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 6 Firms Reporting Skills as Obstacles  
 
Sources: Enterprise Surveys, Authors’ calculations 
 
Despite its importance, both in terms of the number of migrants and its effects on the national 
economy, Romanian migration is an understudied phenomenon. This paper aims to address part 
of this shortfall.  We will test what triggers migrants’ plans to return to Romania.  We will test 
whether wage differences, likelihood of employment in Romania, duration of migration, family 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
High school (pop) Tertiary (pop)
High school (emigrants) Tertiary (emigrants)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2002 2005 2009 2013
Does not apply
Don't know
Very Severe Obstacle
Major obstacle
Moderate obstacle
Minor Obstacle
No Obstacle
5 
 
push and pull factors and networks are significantly linked to planning to return to Romania. The 
data used mean we can also explicitly control for education/training attained abroad and whether 
this has any effect on the decision to migrate back to Romania.  This will test whether migrants 
perceive the returns to these skills as being greater in the home country than the host country.  
However, training abroad may have a separate integration effect that also influences the decision 
to return migrate.  Information on previous and expected investment decisions of migrants is 
also utilized to test for ties with the host country and Romania.   
The next section will review previous theoretical and empirical evidence on the causes of return 
migration and an overview of Romanian migration in the post-Communist period.  Section III 
will present the method used to model plans to return to Romania and the hypotheses to be 
tested.  Section IV will discuss the data used and the descriptive statistics.  Section V will present 
and analyze the results from our model.  Section VI will offer a summary of the findings and 
questions for future research. 
 
 
II Theoretical and Empirical Review on Return Migration 
Theoretical Literature Review 
Standard economic theory argues that rational agents migrate wherever the expected present 
value of the total benefits outweighs the total costs of migration.  The decision to return home is 
modeled within a utility maximizing framework by Galor and Stark (1990, 1991) and Djajic and 
Milbourne (1988) in which wages are lower in the home country than the host country and initial 
migration increases migrants’ lifetime wealth.  Despite this earnings gap, return migrants have a 
preference for living in their country of birth that results in a higher marginal utility of 
consumption in the home country than in the host country.  Dustman and Weiss (2007) argue 
that migrants return home when the marginal cost of being away from the home country exceeds 
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.  Similar preference arguments are made by Hill (1987), 
Raffelhuschen (1992) and Yang (2006, 2008).  Constant and Massey (2003) posit that migrants 
are more likely to migrate back to their home country because they have moved once before and 
also have better information on which to base their decision to return or not.  The subjective, 
perceived, expected and actual relative ranking/position of individuals can also motivate decision 
making, including the returning home of migrants.  Stark and Taylor (1991) and Stark (1992) 
argue that relative deprivation of migrants in the host country can cause return migration despite 
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large cross-country wage differentials.  Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) model return migration 
within a life cycle framework where immigrants return home having realized some pre-
determined savings goals.  Mesnard (2004) develops a formal model of return migration triggered 
by achieving a savings target based on imperfect capital markets in the country of origin. Borjas 
and Bratsberg (1996) also predict return migration because of an error in the expected monetary 
benefits of migrating to the host country.  In addition to these preference models of return 
migration, some of the recent brain-gain literature focuses on experiences gained abroad having 
higher returns in the home country (Reinhold and Thom, 2009; Barret and O’Connell, 2000; 
Barret and Goggin, 2010; Iara, 2006).  Similarly, skills acquired abroad may have higher returns in 
the home country than in the host country, causing return migration (Dustman, 1994, 1995; 
Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003; Mayr and Peri, 2008).  Other factors 
that may affect the return migration process include information costs (Jayet and Gannon, 1991, 
Stark, 1995; Dustmann, 1998), the role of remittances (Rapoport and Docquier (2003); Dustman 
and Metres, 2009) and purchasing power differentials (Djajic, 1988; Stark, Helmenstein and 
Yegorov, 1997; Dustmann, 1997). 
 
Empirical Literature Review 
Zimmermann (1995) provides a historical account of migration within Europe in the post-World 
War II era that highlights four major migration periods, the last being triggered by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Labor migration within Europe was assumed 
to be temporary in nature, unlike migration to North America, which was more likely to be 
permanent.  Empirical evidence to support this view is found in Bohning (1981, 1987) and 
Glytsos (1988).  With respect to transitional countries’ migrants, surveys undertaken by the 
International Organisation for Migration (1998) found that over 80 percent of these migrants 
wished to return home from Western European countries within a few years of departure. 
 
While the number of migrants is both politically and economically important, much recent 
academic work has focused on testing the theories of return migration using cross-sectional data.  
Borjas (1989) finds that less–skilled, poorer paid migrants in America are more likely to return 
home, while Reagan and Olsen (2000) find that migrants with a US college degree are more likely 
to return to their country of birth consistent with the returns to a degree being greater in the 
home (poor) than host (wealthy) country due to relative scarcity.  In Europe, Dustmann (1996) 
analyzes the likelihood of return migration by workers in Germany, finding that years of 
residence in the host country, competency in speaking German and level of education all reduce 
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the likelihood of returning, while having children in the home country and being married 
increase the likelihood of returning.  Constant and Massey (2003) find the likelihood of 
emigrants returning home from Germany increases if migrants remit home, have strong ties with 
home, are not wage-employed or have been a host resident for less than five years.  Indicators of 
greater social assimilation within Germany reduce return likelihood. 
 
Neckby (2006) differentiates between return migrants and migrants who emigrate from the host 
country to another host country and finds the likelihood of both increases with education.  What 
kind of economic activities return migrants choose has been analyzed by Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp (2002), Radu and Epstein (2007) and Shima (2010) in Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.  
Although the first two studies found that the more educated return migrants choose self-
employment activities, something that is explained by higher returns to education in this activity 
compared to an employee, Shima finds that skills acquired abroad and the intention of a 
permanent return increase the likelihood of participating in the labor market upon returning.6  
Piracha and Vadean (2010) find that returning Albanian migrants who have achieved their 
savings goal and are more educated are more likely to become entrepreneurs compared to non-
migrant working age Albanians.  Less skilled returning Albanian migrants are, at least initially, 
more likely to be self-employed (own-account workers) than employees.  Co, Gang and Yun 
(2000) find no evidence of returning male migrants earning more than male non-migrants in 
Hungary, but do find an earnings gap for females.  This is consistent with females receiving 
higher returns to the occupation-specific human capital accumulated in the host country, in 
Hungary.  Hazans (2008) finds a clear earnings gap between return migrants and non-migrants in 
Latvia again consistent with the theory that human capital acquired abroad has greater returns in 
the home country while also arguing that the savings of return migrants means they can search 
longer.  The study by Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006) finds that Bulgarian households with a 
return migrant are more likely to have benefited from remittances in terms of household 
earnings and are more likely to have their own business, consistent with the work of Mesnard 
(2004).  Iara (2006) and  Martin and Radu (2012) find that returning migrants from across 
Central and Eastern Europe earn more than non-migrants in both self-employment and paid 
employment, while there is mixed evidence on the type of economic activity return migrants are 
likely to undertake. 
 
6 The World Bank Survey data Shima uses in his work is drawn from highly educated return migrants so the findings 
of Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) and Radu and Epstein (2007) are not likely to be found. 
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The evidence to date strongly suggests that duration of stay in the host country, age when first 
migrated, education level before migrating, human capital acquired during migration and ties to 
the host and home countries all play some role in return migration.  Evidence also suggests that 
return migrants earn more than non-migrants and that they are more likely to grow their own 
business that employs others. 
 
III Method 
The likelihood of migrants returning is estimated using a probit model, where 1 is equal to those 
who “…plan to return to Romania (to live and work there permanently in the future)?” and 0 
otherwise.  The variables of interest are mostly taken from the International Agency for Source 
Country Information (IASCI), Soros Foundation and are based on previous findings in the 
literature.  A number of push and pull factors are included such as whether the migrant has 
family in Romania, whether they remit home, whether there was already a network in the host 
country that assisted the migrant in finding a job or residence and whether the migrant has 
previously invested in the host country.  The number of years being a migrant is included in our 
model to capture integration within the host country as well as the individual’s preference for 
being a migrant and the benefits this brings. 
 
In keeping with previous theoretical and empirical work in the literature, we estimate an earnings 
gap between current earnings in the host country and estimated earnings in Romania.  Estimated 
predicted earnings of migrants were based on using the estimated coefficients from a Heckman 
earnings model that used individual and household labor information from the 2012 Romanian 
Household Budget Survey (HBS).  Only a very basic earnings equation could be estimated since 
much information could not be matched between the HBS and the IASCI.  The earnings 
equation is consistent with a priori labor theory, e.g. a concave relationship between age and 
earnings and the more educated earning more.7  Although we capture the relative earnings 
position of migrants, it would be interesting also to capture relative deprivation of migrants.  The 
data allow us to calculate whether migrants have a better, same or worse occupation in the host 
country than they held in Romania prior to migrating and test the theoretical models of 
7 All earnings are in Euros.  HMS earnings data was converted into Euros based on the average foreign 
exchange between the Euro and Romanian Lei being 0.23 between 2010 and 2012 
(http://www.freecurrencyrates.com/exchange-rate-history/RON-EUR).  The HBS does not contain individual 
level information on earnings, instead only reporting income from employment at the household level.  We 
based our sample on those households who had just one full-time worker to avoid the incomplete information 
problem of not knowing which worker earned what in the household.  While this approach means losing many 
observations it does mean the sample we are left with contains more accurate earnings information. 
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determinants of return migration of Stark and Taylor (1991) and Stark (1992).  It is expected, 
ceteris paribus, that migrants who have better (worse) occupations are less (more) likely to reveal 
return intentions. 
 
Other variables of interest capture possible ‘brain-gain’ pathways.  Firstly information on 
whether the migrant has undertaken any training is captured.  Table 1 illustrates that 11-12 
percent of our sample undertook at least language or vocational training while in the host 
country, additional to education undertaken in Romania.  By controlling for such training we can 
test whether there is any potential brain-gain mechanism where perceived or expected returns to 
this human capital investment are greater in the host country or Romania.  Another potential 
form of brain gain that we can capture is the risk-taking attitudes of migrants.  We create a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the migrant has acquired skills or experiences that have 
influenced investment interest. Socioeconomic characteristics such as age, marital status, children 
and education level are controlled as well as a group of industry dummies within which migrants 
work.  Rather than individual country dummies, we place countries into six categories, Southern 
Europe, Northern Europe, non-Romance Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Non-European 
English Speaking and other countries. 
 
There are some weaknesses with the data.  Firstly we do not have any information on actual 
return migration, only the intention to return.  Longitudinal studies have shown that intention to 
initially migrate is a good predictor of actual migration (Van Dalen and Henkens, 2008; Boheim 
and Taylor, 2002), a finding consistent with the theoretical work of De Jong (1999, 2000) and 
Burda et al. (1998).  While initial migration and return migration are driven by different factors, it 
is hard to think that intention and actual return migration would not also be correlated for our 
sample of emigrants. 
 
Secondly the data we use in the analysis are not drawn from a random sample.  Of the migrants 
interviewed, the poorly paid, unemployed, those that live far away, those who left more recently 
and illegal migrants will likely be underrepresented.  Thirdly we do not control for selection into 
the initial decision to migrate since this is not contained in the data set.  If migrants are less likely 
to be high-skilled or highly educated, then they are negatively selected with respect to these two 
human capital characteristics.  Borjas and Bratsberg (1994) argue that return migrants from this 
group will tend to be the best of the worst.  If migrants were positively selected with respect to 
human capital characteristics, then return migrants would tend to have either the highest or 
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lowest education levels.  This has implications for the robustness of possible brain-gain 
estimations.  The evidence on these selectivity effects is not conclusive (see Constant and 
Massey, 2003 for a summary of findings) and differs by the country of interest but represents a 
caveat when interpreting our estimations of intentions to return to Romania. 
IV Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The IASCI and the Soros Foundation in Romania surveyed Romanian migrants in August 2010. 
They interviewed nearly 3,000 migrants aged 18 years or older who were returning to Romania 
for a short visit at major air and land entry points and who had been economic migrants for one 
year or longer. The survey gathered detailed information including on employment, income, 
connections to Romania, networks, and education, as well as demographic information. The 
survey is rich but, as noted above, the methodology means that some caveats should be taken 
into consideration. Certain groups are likely to be underrepresented: this includes those who earn 
less money in their host country including the unemployed, those that live further away, those 
that migrated more recently, and illegal migrants who may have more difficulty re-entering their 
host country. The survey cannot therefore be taken to represent a cross-section of Romanian 
migrants. Nonetheless, the results provide a good insight into migrant labor market outcomes.  
Of those surveyed, over 70 percent were in Southern Europe and 20 percent in Northern 
Europe. About 53 percent had a high school education compared with 70 percent of the total 
population. This reflects for example significant numbers of relatively unskilled migrants who 
sought work in the Spanish construction sector. Around 90 percent of migrants reported 
speaking well or fluently the language of their host country. This is partly a reflection of the 
linguistic similarities between Romania and the two main host countries – Spain and Italy. 
Despite the work restrictions in place on Romanians in many EU countries, 84 percent of 
migrants were legally entitled to work.  Migrants tended to have either a similar or worse 
occupation when compared to working in Romania, consistent with previous work by Cingolani 
(2007).  Typical examples were nurses who worked in old-age homes in Italy or skilled 
mechanics who become unskilled laborers in the construction sector in Spain. Networks played 
an important role in migration with 49 percent having received assistance from a friend or family 
member in gaining employment or accommodation upon migrating. Connections to Romania 
were still important: 64 percent of migrants reported having remitted money to Romania during 
the previous year. Migrants were less likely to be female than the average of the population (48 
percent against 51.3 percent), likely to live in a smaller household (average size of 2.1 among 
migrants compared with 2.9 for the total population), and were younger than the average 
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Romanian (35 on average at the time of the survey against a population average of 398).  No 
information was gathered on ethnicity of the migrants.9  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
   
Variables Mean Std Error 
   
Intention to Return home 0.426 0.010 
Earnings Gap (logs) 6.730 0.012 
Probability of being employed if return to Romania – based on 2012 
Household Budget Survey 0.444 0.005 
Average Earnings of migrant workers (Euros) 1333.39 21.902 
Predicted Earnings in Romania (Euros) – based on 2012 Household 
Budget Survey. 320.57 1.7889 
Predicted earnings gap (Logs)  6.70 0.013 
Predicted earnings (Logs) 5.74 0.0054 
Assistance 0.487 0.010 
Many Romanians nearby 0.434 0.011 
Some Romanians nearby 0.356 0.010 
No Romanians nearby 0.210 0.009 
Speak well or fluently 0.899 0.006 
Fluent and Language Training abroad 0.115 0.007 
Fluent and no Language Training abroad 0.784 0.009 
Not Fluent and Language Training abroad 0.003 0.001 
Not Fluent and no Language Training abroad 0.098 0.006 
Other training while abroad 0.258 0.011 
Skills and experienced effected investment interest 0.644 0.010 
Invested in host country 0.068 0.005 
Legal Migrant 0.844 0.008 
Spouse in Romania 0.173 0.008 
Child <18 years 0.160 0.008 
Child >18 years 0.119 0.007 
Parents in Romania 0.686 0.010 
Remittance 0.653 0.010 
Share of Remittance on necessities 0.338 0.009 
Share of Remittance on savings 0.108 0.005 
Share of Remittance on investment 0.021 0.003 
Share of Remittance on house improvement 0.187 0.007 
Invested in Romania  0.181 0.008 
Return to Romania several times a year or more 0.254 0.009 
Tenure as Migrant 6.424 0.096 
Same occupation 0.555 0.011 
Better occupation 0.084 0.006 
Worse occupation 0.362 0.010 
Agriculture 0.061 0.005 
Construction 0.277 0.010 
Hotel 0.112 0.007 
8 Population data available from Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database 
9 This is a pity given the importance of the Roma population in Romania, and the fact that demographic changes 
mean that they represent an increasing share of the working age population.  Future research is required in this area.  
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Manufactured 0.119 0.007 
Transport 0.052 0.005 
Health 0.034 0.004 
Trade 0.052 0.005 
Domestic 0.220 0.009 
Other 0.074 0.006 
Age 35.379 0.203 
Age-Squared 1341.918 15.492 
Female 0.472 0.011 
Household Size 2.115 0.027 
Rural 0.330 0.010 
Married 0.615 0.010 
Children 0.241 0.009 
No education 0.004 0.001 
Prime education 0.008 0.002 
General education 0.067 0.005 
Vocational education 0.276 0.010 
High School education 0.516 0.011 
Higher education 0.131 0.007 
South Europe 0.714 0.010 
Northern Europe 0.203 0.009 
Non-Rom South Europe 0.063 0.005 
Eastern Europe 0.006 0.002 
Non-European Anglophone 0.010 0.002 
Other countries 0.004 0.001 
   
Observations 2,163  
Sources: IASCI; Soros Foundation; Author calculations. 
V Results 
The regression results for planned return migration are presented in Table 2.  Controls are 
included for socioeconomic characteristics, region of migration and current industry.  In line 
with migration and return migration theory, we are mainly interested in push and pull factors as 
well as variables that we interpret as possible avenues for ‘brain gain’ effects.  We present results 
as ranges as results differ slightly depending upon model specification.  
Consistent with standard migration theory, we find that an increase in the earnings gap of 1 
percent (the difference between actual earnings in host country and predicted earnings in 
Romania) reduces the likelihood of perceived returning to Romania by around 10 percent.10 
Interestingly, the probability of being employed in Romania is negative (though insignificant), 
suggesting that those who are more likely to find work in Romania are less likely to return. This 
10 An avenue of future work would be to estimate other relative earnings measures, notably actual earnings relative 
to predicted earnings in the host country, or by current or previous occupational group.  The importance of relative 
earnings and relative position are known to be important in both mainstream economics, but also in other schools 
of thought notably within happiness economics and behavioural economics.  
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is likely indicative of the fact that the same people are also more likely to find work in their host 
country. 
Assimilation and network effects are both expected to influence planned return migration.  
Assimilation here is captured by both age of the migrant and years as a migrant.  The findings 
here are not robust to different model specifications, but what evidence there is supports the 
embedded argument, with an extra 10 years as a migrant reducing return likelihood by 3 to 7 
percentage points.   
Factors that could persuade migrants to remain include networks within the host country.  These 
networks can help embed migrants into the host country and in this regard we control for 
whether or not migrants received assistance when they moved; and whether there are a large 
number of Romanians in the community in which the migrant is living. We may expect that 
assistance from friends in the host country prior to migrating would act as a pull to remain in the 
host country, but this has no effect.  To capture other Romanian networks in host countries, we 
use information on whether there are many, some or no persons from place of origin living in 
close proximity to the migrant.  Having many fellow Romanians nearby increases the likelihood 
of return migration by 5.2 to 5.6 percentage points.  It could be that this network helps preserve 
ties with Romania but also re-enforces national identity amongst migrants that deters complete 
integration into the host country.  Certainly more work is required into identity, integration and 
migration in this regard.11 
What strongly determines remaining in the host country is proficiency in speaking the host 
country language and whether the migrant is legal or not.  The former is expected and the effect 
is very large.  Those who speak the native language fluently or well are around 17.4 percentage 
points less likely to plan to return migrate compared to those who do not speak the language or 
speak it a little.  Interpretation of the result though is opaque since speaking the language could 
have been a pre-condition to deciding to migrate in the first place and there could have been a 
conscious decision to invest time and money in obtaining this skill.  However it could also be 
that migrants learnt the language in the host country.  To distinguish between fluency before and 
after migration we use information on whether the migrant has undertaken any training in the 
host country which distinguishes between different types of training.  In Models 6 to 10 we 
combine language fluency and whether the migrant has undertaken any language training in the 
host country.  We find that those who are fluent and have undertaken language training are 16.2 
11 Work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and more recently Georgiadis and Manning (2013) analyses different kinds 
of identity and how this could be measured and this work is relevant and unexplored in the migration literature. 
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to 21.2 percentage points less likely to return migrate, while those who are fluent with no training 
are 13.8 to 16.8 percentage points less likely to return migrate though only the former is 
significant at the 10 percent level.  In Model 7 in Table 2b, we also include a dummy for other 
training undertaken in the host country (e.g. vocational training) which is negative but 
insignificant.  The cross-sectional nature of the data restricts interpretation particularly, in this 
case, because we do not know whether these migrants perceive such skills as having a higher 
return in Romania than abroad.  However the model does control for age and years as a migrant, 
so our results are not consistent with the brain-gain argument of Dustman (1994, 1995), Borjas 
and Bratsberg, (1996), Santos and Postel-Vinay, (2003) and Mayr and Peri, (2008). 
There is no reason to think that brain-gain pathways could not also include changes to 
preferences as a result of migrating.  These pathways could include a greater preference for 
(in)tolerance towards others or in learning and trusting others.  Related to this, we control for 
whether migrants’ experiences acquired abroad have changed their interest in investment.  When 
we include this simple term in our model it is not relevant but a greater focus on the changes in 
attitudes of migrants and whether these are potentially beneficial to Romania is needed in the 
literature.   
As well as capturing human capital investment in the host country, it would also be of interest to 
test whether other investment in the host country reduces the probability of return migration 
since this, like human capital investment, would act as a restraint on leaving.  The data set allows 
us to control for investment or credit provision for a business in the host country.  It is perhaps 
more likely that such investments are in Romanian owned start-up or small/medium sized 
businesses or certainly in businesses that have ties with the Romanian community rather than in 
larger firms (e.g. through the purchasing of shares).  Models 11 to 16 in Table 2b estimate that 
migrants who do undertake such investment decisions are around 7 percentage points less likely 
to return migrate, confirming expectations, although this is significant only in some models.  In 
order to capture the uncertainty of migration, model 10 includes a dummy variable for whether 
the migrant can legally work or not. Legal migrants are around 14.5 percentage points less likely 
to return than illegals.  This could well reflect the perilous nature of being an illegal migrant 
feeding into a greater desire to return to Romania where life is less uncertain.  Among legal 
migrants though there could well be a perception and desire to maximize the opportunity they 
have in the host country and other potential destination countries in the future, something akin 
to a premium of being able to work legally. 
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Table 2b also includes a variety of Romanian pull variables.  Generally these perform well in our 
models. Having young or old children residing in Romania plays a large part in planning to 
return home.  Having children of less than 18 years of age increases the probability of returning 
by 6.5 to 9.1 percentage points, while the figure is 14.5 to 17.1 percentage points for children 
older than 18.  This is perhaps surprising but could reflect a commitment to return to help and 
support working age children, or in expectation of being supported by them.   
Those who remit something home are 9.9 to 11.9 percentage points more likely to return, 
reflecting established ties to Romania.  There could though be differences in return intentions 
depending on how remittances are spent in Romania.  For example, someone remitting mainly to 
invest in the family home may have different return intentions to those mainly remitting money 
for food and other necessities.  Using information on the share of total remittances specified for 
consumption, savings, investment and investment in the home we find in model 11 that there are 
differences in return intentions, but that an increase in any share of specified remittance 
increases the chances of returning. A 1 percentage point rise in remittances specified for 
consumption as a share of total remittances (remittance for consumption/total remittance) 
results in a 3.6 to 4.1 percentage point rise in the likelihood of returning, while the figure for 
savings and home improvements are 16.9 to 17.6 percent and 12.9 to 13.3 percentage points 
increase, respectively.  This indicates that a savings target or home improvement target by 
migrants predicts a far greater likelihood of return intention. 
While we have controlled for investment in the host country and found this to reduce the 
likelihood of return intention by around 7 percentage points, when we include previous 
investment in Romania (model 11 onwards) this increases return intention by 16-17.3 percentage 
points.  The size of this marginal effect is perhaps surprising given remittances are also 
controlled for in the model.  This indicates the importance to differentiate wherever possible 
between remittances and business investments back home.  
One theoretical argument for return migration is that migrants’ expectations are not met or that 
they feel deprived relative to being in Romania.  We model such an effect by including 
occupational gap variables that capture whether a migrant worker has a worse, similar or better 
occupation in the host country compared to Romania.  Unfortunately this means losing those 
migrants who are self-employed or unemployed in the host country and those who previously 
had no job in Romania.  Model 13 reveals there is no statistical relationship between our measure 
of relative deprivation and return likelihood. 
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VI Summary, Policy Implications, and Future Research 
This paper has used a new data set to test a number of theories of return migration with respect 
to Romanian migrants.  This research is particularly interesting in the context of how migration 
is perceived within the European Union now that restrictions have been lifted further.  The 
paper finds that an earnings gap, having invested in a business in the host country and 
investment in human capital abroad, particularly in speaking the host-country language, 
significantly reduce the likelihood of Romanians returning.  The intention to learn a foreign 
language is a clear signal of intent to integrate into the host country and in this regard is 
something to be welcomed by the host country itself.  We do find strong evidence of personal 
ties with Romania predicting a greater likelihood of returning as well as remittances and previous 
investment in Romania, while there is also evidence that having many Romanians living nearby 
in the host country also positively effects return likelihood. 
Romania’s declining population and the accompanying negative consequences could be partly 
moderated by encouraging migration to Romania or return migration. This paper has focused on 
the latter option which, for a country without a recent history of attracting migrants and speaking 
a language few outside the country learn, could be more viable in the short term. Nearly half of 
Romanian migrants surveyed planned to return home but this study has shown that several 
factors are related to this choice. Higher expected earnings in Romania and investment in (likely 
small) enterprises are positively correlated with plans to return to Romania. This suggests that 
policies that increase productivity and therefore wages could encourage Romanians abroad to 
return-migrate. In addition, policies that make it easier to begin and run a profitable firm could 
also attract return-migration. Improving the business climate would be a good step in the right 
direction. Finally, the Romanian government could improve both tracking of and connections to 
Romanians abroad. Currently, this is left to private groups such as the League of Romanian 
Students Abroad but there could be benefits to making this more systematic. For example, the 
Malaysian government tracks its ex-patriots and is able to attract some high-caliber individuals to 
return to positions in the public service or SOEs. 
There are several areas of research that need exploring on the basis of this study.  Firstly the role 
national identity plays in return migration is likely to be important but as yet is relatively 
unexplored.  Recent work by Georgellis and Manning (2013) suggests that the more educated 
tend to have less of an identity while poorer people have stronger national identities.  This study 
finds that education plays no role in return intentions but the negative sign on the highly 
educated variable is consistent with the identity literature. 
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The importance of earning reference points and indeed other reference points needs further 
research to test whether these are particular concerns for migrants.  Comparing earnings to the 
different host country averages and gathering information on reservation and expected earnings 
could produce some interesting findings for return intentions but also to the life satisfaction and 
well-being of migrants. Breaking down the relationship between remittance payments and return 
intentions requires more work.   
Finally, the data set used provides insights into the role of social networks and investment 
behavior, with the latter being closely linked to remittances. A deeper analysis of the former 
would allow for a better understanding of the networks migrants use to help them migrate, seek 
employment and other support. The latter would provide a deeper insight into how migrants 
might be able to support economic growth, job creation and poverty reduction in their home 
country without necessarily returning. 
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Table 2a Plan to Return (Marginal Effects reported) 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
    
Probability of being employed in Romania -0.269 -0.266  
Predicted earnings in Romania -0.000   
Predicted earnings in Romania (Logs)  0.017  
Actual Earnings-Predicted Earnings (Logs)   -0.103*** 
Agriculture -0.049 -0.048 -0.071 
Hotel -0.071 -0.072 -0.072* 
Manufactured -0.039 -0.040 -0.030 
Transport -0.097* -0.097* -0.081 
Health -0.171** -0.173** -0.135** 
Trade -0.106* -0.106* -0.104* 
Domestic 0.055 0.055 0.024 
Other -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.126*** 
Age 0.027 0.025 -0.004 
Age-Squared -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Female -0.131** -0.122* -0.087*** 
Household Size -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.057*** 
Rural 0.044* 0.044* 0.037 
Married -0.008 -0.008 0.030 
Children -0.060* -0.061* -0.064* 
No education -0.276 -0.261 -0.140 
Prime education 0.128 0.142 0.142 
General education -0.027 -0.016 0.025 
Vocational education 0.025 0.031 0.044* 
Higher education -0.001 -0.020 -0.055 
Northern Europe -0.058** -0.059** -0.035 
Non-Rom South Europe 0.050 0.049 0.026 
Eastern Europe -0.427*** -0.431*** -0.397*** 
Non-European Anglophone -0.082 -0.081 -0.074 
Other countries 0.293* 0.288 0.259 
    
Observations 2,011 2,011 1,990 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference groups are not 
fluent and no language training abroad, worse occupation, construction, high-school education, 
Southern Europe.  
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Table 2b Plan to Return (Marginal Effects reported) 
VARIABLES Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
        
lnearngap6 -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.081*** 
Assistance -0.019 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.019 -0.011 
Many 
Romanians 
nearby 
0.056* 0.053* 0.053* 0.052* 0.052* 0.052* 0.055* 
Some 
Romanians 
nearby 
0.056* 0.052* 0.053* 0.052* 0.052* 0.050* 0.055* 
YrAgoMigr -0.007** -0.005* -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
Proficient in 
host language 
 -0.174***      
Fluent and 
Language 
Training abroad 
  -0.212*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.191*** -0.162*** 
Fluent and no 
Language 
Training abroad 
  -0.168*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.161*** -0.138*** 
Not Fluent and 
Language 
Training abroad 
  -0.158 -0.158 -0.157 -0.152 -0.163 
Other training 
while abroad 
   -0.038 -0.038 -0.036 -0.033 
Skills and 
experienced 
effected 
investment 
interest 
    -0.002 -0.002 0.005 
Invested in host 
country 
     -0.056 -0.052 
Legal Migrant       -0.145*** 
Agriculture -0.081 -0.107** -0.105** -0.105** -0.105** -0.108** -0.114** 
Hotel -0.073* -0.071 -0.067 -0.061 -0.061 -0.062 -0.056 
Manufactured -0.032 -0.030 -0.029 -0.025 -0.025 -0.028 -0.023 
Transport -0.081 -0.069 -0.062 -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.048 
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Health -0.142** -0.134** -0.121* -0.112 -0.112 -0.115* -0.103 
Trade -0.093* -0.085 -0.081 -0.082 -0.082 -0.077 -0.066 
Domestic 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.001 
Other -0.122*** -0.109** -0.113** -0.109** -0.109** -0.109** -0.106** 
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Age-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Female -0.088*** -0.079** -0.076** -0.075** -0.075** -0.081*** -0.077** 
Household Size -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.045*** 
Rural 0.039 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.036 
Married 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.021 
Children -0.063* -0.067* -0.063* -0.062* -0.062* -0.057 -0.058 
No education -0.102 -0.126 -0.130 -0.120 -0.119 -0.041 -0.051 
Prime education 0.139 0.142 0.138 0.148 0.148 0.146 0.138 
General 
education 
0.028 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.027 
Vocational 
education 
0.048* 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.040 
Higher 
education 
-0.057 -0.058 -0.055 -0.054 -0.054 -0.051 -0.054 
Northern 
Europe 
-0.029 -0.059** -0.056** -0.055* -0.055* -0.055* -0.064** 
Non-Rom 
South Europe 
0.031 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
Eastern Europe -0.397*** -0.456*** -0.446*** -0.431*** -0.431*** -0.431*** -0.455*** 
Non-European 
Anglophone 
-0.059 -0.070 -0.066 -0.054 -0.054 -0.041 -0.075 
Other countries 0.276 0.216 0.221 0.253 0.254 0.246 0.268 
        
Observations 1,980 1,975 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,962 1,962 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference groups are not 
fluent and no language training abroad, worse occupation, construction, high-school education, 
Southern Europe.  
 
 
21 
 
  
Table 2c Plan to Return (Marginal Effects reported) 
 
VARIABLES Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) 
       
lnearngap6 -0.081*** -0.086*** -0.078*** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.083*** 
assist -0.017 -0.027 -0.029 -0.026 -0.023 -0.026 
othermig1 0.053* 0.048* 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.047 
othermig2 0.061** 0.059** 0.069** 0.067** 0.064** 0.066** 
YrAgoMigr -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Fluent and Language 
Training abroad 
-0.149*** -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.154*** -0.141*** 
Fluent and no 
Language Training 
abroad 
-0.128*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.113*** 
Not Fluent and 
Language Training 
abroad 
-0.186 -0.181 -0.139 -0.170 -0.166 -0.155 
Other training while 
abroad 
-0.028 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 -0.027 
Skills and experienced 
effected investment 
interest 
0.019 0.015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
Invested in host 
country 
-0.046 -0.047 -0.075* -0.073 -0.070 -0.078* 
Legal Migrant -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.151*** -0.148*** -0.146*** 
Spouse in Romania 0.073* 0.058 0.067* 0.060 0.060 0.041 
Child <18 years 0.091*** 0.070** 0.065* 0.076** 0.079** 0.069** 
Child >18 years 0.171*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 
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Parents in Romania 0.010 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.011 
Remit home  0.119*** 0.099***    
Invested in Romania   0.226*** 0.221*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 
Share of Remittance 
on necessities 
   0.041 0.041 0.036 
Share of Remittance 
on savings 
   0.176*** 0.174*** 0.169*** 
Share of Remittance 
on investment 
   0.160* 0.173* 0.161* 
Share of Remittance 
on house 
improvement 
   0.129*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
Same occupation     -0.028 -0.023 
Better occupation     -0.091** -0.083* 
Return several times a 
year or more to 
Romania 
     0.101*** 
Agriculture -0.123** -0.119** -0.105** -0.103** -0.115** -0.123** 
Hotel -0.057 -0.052 -0.055 -0.051 -0.054 -0.058 
Manufactured -0.022 -0.024 -0.017 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
Transport -0.051 -0.046 -0.038 -0.038 -0.032 -0.043 
Health -0.105 -0.106 -0.083 -0.082 -0.081 -0.087 
Trade -0.053 -0.052 -0.047 -0.039 -0.038 -0.050 
Domestic -0.007 -0.021 -0.009 -0.010 -0.033 -0.034 
Other -0.104** -0.102** -0.088* -0.084* -0.092** -0.103** 
Age -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 
Age-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Female -0.079*** -0.072** -0.055* -0.054* -0.049 -0.046 
Household Size -0.023* -0.025** -0.029** -0.027** -0.027** -0.025** 
Rural 0.036 0.040* 0.047** 0.042* 0.044* 0.045* 
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Married -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.030 -0.027 -0.029 
Children -0.025 -0.020 -0.022 -0.016 -0.011 -0.004 
No education -0.055 -0.104 -0.087 -0.115 -0.121 -0.132 
Prime education 0.076 0.059 0.111 0.119 0.117 0.132 
General education 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.038 0.042 0.043 
Vocational education 0.039 0.037 0.042* 0.050** 0.054** 0.049* 
Higher education -0.029 -0.035 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.031 
Northern Europe -0.070** -0.060** -0.056** -0.055* -0.055** -0.069** 
Non-Rom South 
Europe 
-0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.003 
Eastern Europe -0.432*** -0.407*** -0.395*** -0.394*** -0.388*** -0.444*** 
Non-European 
Anglophone 
-0.084 -0.025 -0.005 0.000 -0.015 -0.015 
Other countries 0.258 0.250 0.194 0.207 0.218 0.204 
       
Observations 1,956 1,953 1,952 1,946 1,923 1,921 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference groups are not 
fluent and no language training abroad, worse occupation, construction, high-school education, 
Southern Europe. 
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